

Aeropers Rundschau

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1954 → 2014

BEILAGEN: Air Traffic Control Requirements from the Airline
Pilots' Viewpoint
Air Traffic Control - Private Pilots' Viewpoint

Unfallberichte: Bourke 15.12.1955
Stansted 30.4.1956

Die Anpassung des Gesamteinkommens der SR-Piloten
an die Verhältnisse bei ausländischen Unterneh-
mungen (G.St.)

Liebe Mitglieder !

1. Vertragsverhandlungen: Am 5.März fand eine erste Besprechung mit dem Herrn Direktionspräsidenten statt. Die wesentlichen Punkte unseres Kündigungsschreibens - über dessen Inhalt sie in der letzten Rundschau orientiert wurden - wurden kurz besprochen.

Was den Fall HB-IRW anbelangt, so ist es heute an der Geschäftsleitung, uns Vorschläge zu unterbreiten, welche der Situation Rechnung tragen und für uns annehmbar sind.

Auf die übrigen Punkte wurde bereits etwas näher eingetreten, und nach den Äusserungen des Herrn Direktionspräsidenten dürfen wir mit einiger Zuversicht damit rechnen, dass eine Verständigung erzielt werden kann. Die rückwirkende Inkraftsetzung einzelner Artikel des künftigen Vertrages wird allerdings vielleicht einige Schwierigkeiten bieten. Aber wir sind ja nicht schuld, dass die bisherigen Verhandlungen nicht genügend ernst genommen wurden. Unseres Erachtens sollten sechs Monate genügen, um auch einen komplizierten Vertrag zu revidieren, und so hätte der neue Vertrag ohne weiteres auf den 1.Januar 1957 bereit gestellt werden können.

Doch erstens kommt es anders,
und zweitens, als man denkt:
Gar oft trinkt einer selber,
was er so eingeschenkt !

2. Ausländer: Unter dem Vorsitz von Herrn Dr.Berchtold wurden am 8.März die aktuellen Probleme der Ausländerpiloten zwischen Aeropers und Flight OPS besprochen. Unsere Delegation wies deutlich auf verschiedene Mängel hin. Nach den erteilten Zusagen soll nun Ordnung geschaffen werden. Der Swissair-Standard muss gehalten werden, und es werden keine Konzessionen mehr gemacht - selbst auf die Gefahr hin, dass einige Entlassungen verfügt werden müssen und dann etwas zu wenig Piloten vorhanden sind.

3. Fern-Ost: Am 7.März wurden alle Dienststellen und die Vertreter der verschiedenen Personalgruppen von Herrn Dr.Berchtold über den vorgesehenen Fern-Ost-Betrieb orientiert. Diese Orientierung wurde sehr positiv aufgenommen und bot Gelegenheit, sich zu verschiedenen Fragen zu äussern. Es wäre gut, wenn alle Neuentwicklungen rechtzeitig auf diese Art vorbesprochen werden könnten, zur Erhöhung des Wirkungsgrades und zur Förderung des gegenseitigen Kontakts!

4. Neuaufnahmen: Der Vorstand hat am 12.März die folgenden Herren als Mitglieder aufgenommen:

Bretscher Hanspeter
Miglioretto Paolo
Leyvraz Jean-Jacques
Ruggli Guido
Hürzeler Hans
Gabathuler Hans

5. Aeropers: Ich erhielt aus einzelnen Diskussionen, die ich in letzter Zeit mit Mitgliedern führte, den Eindruck, dass der eine oder andere etwas mit sich herumschleppt, das ihn bedrückt. Die Aeropers ist da, um zu helfen, wo Schwierigkeiten im Beruf auftreten - und alle, ob jung oder alt, haben auf diese Hilfe Anspruch. So möge sich ein jeder, den der Schuh an einem der folgenden oder einem ähnlichen Orte drückt, mit dem Vorstand in Verbindung setzen:

- wenn er mit seiner Qualifikation nicht einverstanden ist,
- wenn er mit einem Vorgesetzten nicht auskommt,
- wenn er sich ändern gegenüber benachteiligt fühlt.

Der Vorstand wird solche Meldungen sorgfältig prüfen und sich dafür einsetzen, dass Mängel oder Unstimmigkeiten behoben werden.

Der Vorstand kann seine Augen nicht überall haben, sondern ist auf Meldungen der Mitglieder angewiesen. Der Einzelne hat kein grosses Gewicht - aber zusammen sind wir stark!

6. Flughafen Genf: Ich weise nochmals auf das letzten Monat versandte Rundschreiben hin und bitte alle, die Genf anfliegen, in den nächsten Wochen und Monaten die Augen offen zu behalten und irgendwelche Meldungen und Beanstandungen mit den notwendigen Einzelheiten an den Vorstand zu leiten, damit sich die Aeropers genügend dokumentieren kann.

7. Rundschau: Der Vorstand hat neuerdings Gesuche von Nichtmitgliedern, die Rundschau zugestellt zu erhalten, abschlägig beantwortet. Die Rundschau ist ein internes Mitteilungs- und Ausspracheblatt der Aeropers, und dass sie zur Orientierung einzelnen Angehörigen der Geschäftsleitung und andern uns nahestehenden Personen zugestellt wird, soll an diesem Charakter nichts ändern.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen:

Der Präsident:

sig. A.Sooder.

ABSTIMMUNGSKOMMENTARE

Nachfolgend, um dem in den nackten Abstimmungszahlen liegenden Stimmungsbild doch noch einige Lichter aufzusetzen, die wesentlichsten Bemerkungen, die von Mitgliedern auf ihrem Stimmzettel betr. Vertragskündigung angebracht wurden (ohne blosse Bravo- und ähnliche für die Vervielfältigung weniger geeignete Rufe, ohne Anregungen betr. einzelne Vertragspunkte und die Führung der Verhandlungen, aber mit getreulicher Abschrift der einzigen gegenläufigen Bemerkung, die sich fand und die als erste aufgeführt wird):

.....

Der jetzt eingeschlagene Weg führt auf geradem Weg zu einem Streik. (Diese Bemerkung wurde mit einer Nein-Stimme verbunden.)

.....

Im Falle einer Annahme dieser Vorlage wäre sicher zu gegebener Zeit eine ausserordentliche Generalversammlung zur eingehenden Besprechung eines neuen Arbeitsvertrages angezeigt. Dabei sollten sämtliche Mitglieder anwesend sein können, was leider die vorübergehende Einstellung des Flugdienstes machen würde.

.....

Verbands-Pressefreiheit! 900 h-Garantie wie SAS, KLM usw.! Block-to-block-Bezahlung! Tarifanpassung an andere Airlines! Revision VE-Reglement! Fristsetzung zur Annahme unserer Forderungen!

.....

Nicht um aus dem Fall Jacob eine Machtprobe zu machen, sondern als Protest gegen die Art der Verhandlung vonseiten der SWR.

.....

Eine Handlung, die schon lange hätte unternommen werden sollen!

.....

Dieser Entschluss wird noch bekräftigt durch die jüngste Entwicklung (Schreiben der Direktion vom 21. Jan. 1957), die erneut den Versuch darstellt, die Aeropers zu spalten!

.....

Ich bitte um Prüfung der Frage, ob man Herrn ... auf Grund seines Verhaltens gegenüber dem Präsidenten und dem Vorstand der Aeropers in der Angelegenheit der separaten Erhöhung der DC-3-Kdt.- und Copiloten-Saläre nicht aus der Aeropers ausschliessen kann.

.....

Es ist eine Schande, dass es soweit kommen musste. Eine Schande für unsere Verhandlungspartner. Gleichzeitig aber können wir stolz sein auf unseren Vorstand und im speziellen auf unseren Präsidenten. Der Beweis, dass sich Mannesmut und Aufrichtigkeit doch letz-

ten Endes lohnt, wird in wenigen Tagen erbracht sein. Ebenso der Beweis, dass man nicht ungestraft seine Kameraden verraten kann und nicht ohne Strafe einmal sich für eine Sache einsetzen kann und ein paar Jahre später ...

.....

Nur noch verhandeln, wenn Herr ... von seinem Posten zurücktritt!

.....

Dass sich heute die Vertragskündigung einfach aufdrängt, ist klar. - Der Kampf um unsere Stellung beginnt erst. Er muss entschlossen, hart und in gewisser Beziehung auch rücksichtslos geführt werden. - Es ist besser, die Swissair erleide einmal den längst fälligen brüsken Schock, als dass sie langsam innerlich verfault. - Es ist unsere Pflicht, nach Ablauf des Vertrages ... die Oeffentlichkeit auf gewisse skandalöse Zustände ... aufmerksam zu machen. ... Wenn man verfolgt, wie mit dem zugegebenermassen sauer verdienten Geld in der Swissair grosszügig ... wird, muss man die Sprüche von der "angespannten Finanzlage infolge harter Konkurrenz" entschieden zurückweisen. ... Im entscheidenden Moment dürfen wir - vielleicht entgegen unserer eingefleischten Schweizer-Mentalität - auch vor einem Ausstand nicht zurückschrecken! ...

.....

DIE DYNAMISCHE RENTE

Im Sozialversicherungsamt ... beginne man die Frage zu prüfen, ob bei der fünften Revision der AHV zur dynamischen Rente übergegangen werden soll. Der übliche Vorgang: eine Idee, zuerst mit unwirscher Geste als "undurchführbar" abgelehnt, ist - nachdem das Ausland voranging - auf dem Weg, auch bei uns hoffähig zu werden.

Eine dynamische Rente trägt sowohl dem Produktivitätszuwachs der Wirtschaft wie auch der Geldentwertung Rechnung. Was der Versicherte im Alter wünscht, ist nicht ein bedrucktes Papier, sondern eine bestimmte Kaufkraft. ...

Die Gegner der dynamischen Rente bekämpfen sie mit dem Einwand, sie sei ein "Misstrauensvotum gegen die Stabilität des Geldwerts", sie befördere die Inflation. Ein typischer Fall, wo Wirkung und Ursache verwechselt werden. Impft man die Bevölkerung eines Landes gegen die Pocken, so wird natürlich mit der Möglichkeit gerechnet, es könnte einmal eine Epidemie ausbrechen. Niemand aber wird dafür das vorsorgliche Impfen verantwortlich machen. Genau so verhält es sich mit der Impfung der Altersrente gegen die Folgen der Geldentwertung.

(DIE TAT, 28.2.1957)

DIE PILOTENAUSNUTZUNG 1951-1956

	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956
Schweizerpiloten im Ganzjahreseinsatz	60	67	105	126	142	151
Eff. geflogene Stunden*	58.6	53.7	71.7	95.7	97.8	111.4
Verfügb. Flugstunden* Basis: 900 h/Pil.	54.0	60.0	94.5	113.4	127.0	136.8
Unausgenützte Stunden*	--	6.6	22.8	17.8	30.0	25.4
Ausnutzungsgrad in %	103	89	76	85	76	81
Anzahl standby-Piloten zul. Planung	-	7.3	25	19.7	33.5	28
Verlust in 1000 Fr. Basis: 20000.-/Pil.	-	1.46	500	394	670	560

* Flugstundenzahlen in 1000 h gezählt.

Für die ausländischen Piloten lag der Ausnutzungsgrad im Jahre 1956 bei 84%, was 3 standby-Piloten und einem Verlust von Fr. 60.000.- entspricht.

G.St.

13. Februar 1957. Eine Stunde vor dem Abflug eines Flugzeugs wird bekannt, dass der Copilot noch auf einer andern Strecke fliegt und erst 10 Minuten vor ETD landen wird. Seit Dienstantritt wird er dann genau sieben Stunden unterwegs sein. Crew Control wird daher angefragt, ob tatsächlich dieser Pilot den nächsten Kurs fliegen werde. Vielleicht möchte er auch ein Mittagessen?

Die Antwort, ganz unbefangen: "Jaja, wänns jetzt en Usländer wär ..."

No comment!

K.S.

FLUG- UND BLOCKZEITDIFFERENZEN

Ueberschuss der Block- über die Flugzeit:

1955:

DC-3	12.3 %	
CV-240	13.0 %	
DC-4	11.0 %	(Statistik SR)
DC-6B	8.0 %	

Alle Flugzeuge zusammen: 11.1 %

1956:

a) Kurzstrecken Europa:

DC-3	14 %	(Durchschnittswerte von
CV-240	10 %	60 Flügen im Juli 1956)
DC-4	9 %	
DC-6B	10 %	

b) Langstrecken NA:

DC-6B	6.0 %	(Durchschnittswerte von je 40
DC-7C	4.5 %	Flügen Jan. und Febr. 1956/1957)

Flugzeitdifferenzen DC-6B/DC-7C:

Januar 1956 und 1957:	16 %	(Flugzeit auf total 40
Februar 1956 und 1957:	18 %	Flügen in West- und Ost-
Durchschnitt:	17 %	richtung)

G.St.

EIDGEN.UNTERSUCHUNGSKOMMISSION FUER FLUGUNFAELLE

Die Eidgen. Untersuchungskommission, welche nach Durchführung der administrativen Flugunfalluntersuchung durch das Eidgen. Luftamt als eine Art von zweiter Untersuchungsinstanz amtiert, wurde vor kurzem neu bestellt. Zum Präsidenten wurde vom Bundesgericht neuerdings Bundesrichter Dr. Eduard Arnold ernannt; als Vertreter des Eidgenössischen Luftamtes wird Vizedirektor Ing. Albert Münch amtiert; als Vertreter des Kantons des Unfallortes wurden vom Kanton Genf Yves Maître, vom Kanton Zürich Dr. Georg Dombrowski (Ersatzmann: Dr. Werner Guldemann) ernannt.

RUECKSCHLAG AUF DEM GEBIET DER ZUSAMMENSTOSSWARNUNG

Die amerikanischen Pläne, auf Ende 1958 ein einsatzreifes Gerät zur Zusammenstosswarnung zu besitzen, scheinen nun kaum verwirklicht zu werden können. Collins Radio, Washington D.C. welche die A.T.A. als Generalunternehmer auswählte, haben mitgeteilt, dass die Entwicklung solcher Geräte auf dem eingeschlagenen Weg zur Zeit nicht viel verspricht. Die dafür erteilten Aufträge im Umfang von gegen zehn Millionen Dollar sind von der Firma zurückgegeben worden.

Das Collins PWI-Gerät sollte auf dem Doppler-Radar-Prinzip entwickelt werden und im Führerraum die Annäherung eines jeden anderen Flugzeuges innerhalb zwei Meilen und auf einer Mehr- oder Minderhöhe bis zu 800 ft anzeigen. Eine zweite Entwicklungsphase zielte auf die Schaffung eines Automaten, der die notwendige Ausweichbewegung anzeigen und schliesslich auf der Endstufe der Entwicklung selbst einleiten würde.

Die von Collins betriebenen Vorbereitungsstudien führten zur Erkenntnis, dass dieses Doppler-System Eigenschaften aufweist, die bei Böigkeit die zuverlässige Anzeige eines Kollisionsrisikos ausschliessen.

Collins gedenken die Entwicklung auf einem vollständig anderen Weg wieder aufzunehmen, aber es scheint nun sicher, dass mit solchen Geräten erst viel später gerechnet werden kann, als man hoffte. Das Versagen des Doppler-Systems lässt neuerdings die Frage auftauchen, ob nicht doch ein Gegenseitigkeits-System notwendig ist, welches auf sich ergänzenden Geräten in beiden Flugzeugen beruht.

(THE AEROPLANE, 18.1.1957)

When an aeroplane becomes popular, it collects stories, so pardon me if my Viscount is showing once again. This one concerns BEA's first 802 training flights from Vicker's Wisley airfield. The airline's Capt. W. Tommy Atkins believes in precise flying, but just how precise was not appreciated by Vickers' flight observers until one of them said to him: "Let's do this climb at 105 or 106 knots." Like the young lady who was told by her mother to have a good time at the dance and be a good girl, Capt. Atkins replied: "Well, make up your mind!"

(THE AEROPLANE, December 7, 1956)

LES BESOINS D'EXPLOITATION DES AVIONS A REACTION

Le groupe spécial institué par l'Organisation de l'Aviation civile internationale pour étudier les besoins d'exploitation des avions à réaction a présenté à la Commission de navigation aérienne un rapport qui donne des renseignements nouveaux sur les installations et services au sol dont la mise en oeuvre peut être nécessaire à l'exploitation des avions civils à réaction.

1. Aérodrômes

La chaleur et le souffle des réacteurs ne devraient pas endommager un revêtement de bonne qualité, mais il peut être souhaitable de doter les nouveaux aérodrômes de revêtements spéciaux résistant à la chaleur et au souffle, spécialement sur les aires de point fixe et aux extrémités des pistes. Il paraît bon d'adopter à cette fin des revêtements en béton.

Pour des avions civils à turboréacteurs dotés de dispositifs d'inversion de poussée, l'atterrissage ne posera pas de problèmes plus difficiles que dans le cas d'avions à moteurs alternatifs; toutefois il peut être nécessaire de procéder rapidement au déblayage des pistes enneigées ou glacées.

Il est nécessaire de prévoir pour les avions à réaction une vitesse plus élevée de circulation au sol; les voies de circulation devront donc présenter des courbes à plus grand rayon, de l'ordre de 225 à 300 mètres.

2. Météorologie

Les avions à turboréacteurs voleront à plus haute altitude; il faut donc prévoir une assistance météorologique jusqu'à une altitude d'au moins 14 000 mètres. Pour fixer cette limite, le groupe a tenu compte des caractéristiques de rétablissement de la pression dans la cabine.

La température influe beaucoup sur le poids maximum admissible au décollage, la température le long de la piste, au niveau moyen des prises d'air des moteurs.

Le groupe a reconnu que l'approche manquée pose des problèmes complexes: le contrôle de la circulation aérienne doit en effet donner immédiatement l'autorisation de se diriger vers un aérodrôme de dégagement à tout avion à réaction contraint d'effectuer une approche manquée lorsque les conditions de visibilité diminuent de façon imprévue à l'aérodrôme de destination. La quantité de carburant nécessaire au déroutement est beaucoup plus élevée que si l'avion pouvait amorcer le même déroutement alors qu'il se trouve encore à l'altitude de croisière. C'est pourquoi il

est essentiel que les observations et les prévisions relatives à la visibilité soient établies avec une précision suffisante pour éliminer, en pratique, l'éventualité d'une approche manquée par suite d'une diminution imprévue de la visibilité. Le groupe a souligné qu'il est nécessaire d'accélérer les travaux de recherches entrepris par les Etats membres de l'OACI sur la visibilité pendant que les phases d'approche et d'atterrissage.

3. Services de la circulation aérienne

Le groupe a estimé qu'on ne saurait se fier à une observation visuelle pour éviter les abordages entre des avions volant à grande vitesse. Il a été jugé nécessaire d'assurer à tout moment pour ces avions un espacement effectif (contrôlé à partir du sol), quelles que soient les conditions météorologiques.

Il faut mettre au point des procédures permettant au pilote d'un avion à réaction, dès qu'il a mis ses moteurs en marche, de se rendre en bout de piste et de décoller immédiatement.

Aucune restriction ne doit être imposée aux avions à réaction pour la montée jusqu'à l'altitude optimum de croisière, même s'il est nécessaire d'établir des itinéraires en circuit pour le départ. Cette condition peut obliger à créer des voies à sens unique pour les avions au départ et à recourir le plus possible à l'espacement latéral plutôt qu'à l'espacement vertical. Il sera indispensable de mettre en oeuvre des aides précises à la navigation afin d'assurer cet espacement et d'éviter les limitations imposées à la montée, dans les zones où la circulation est très dense.

Il est nécessaire d'améliorer l'utilisation de l'espace aérien si l'on veut assurer un acheminement efficace et sûr des avions à turbomachines et des autres avions, surtout dans les zones terminales où la circulation est très dense.

Un espacement effectif entre des avions rapides volant à haute altitude exige que les régions de contrôle aient des dimensions suffisantes pour qu'il soit possible d'assurer, dans le temps limité dont on dispose, une coordination entre les différents contrôleurs et la transmission des renseignements sur les vols entre les différentes régions de contrôle. Une solution consiste à créer des "régions de contrôle en haute altitude" ou "régions supérieures de contrôle" ayant une étendue assez grande.

4. Télécommunications et aides à la navigation

Les systèmes classiques d'aides à la navigation pour les vols à moyenne et courte distance semblent convenir aux avions à réaction. Pour la navigation à longue distance, on peut faire appel soit à un équipement de bord autonome, soit à un équipement permettant d'utiliser en vol le guidage fourni par des aides radio

au sol. On procède actuellement à l'étude d'un équipement autonome de radionavigation, mais il est encore impossible de déterminer à quel moment la mise en service de cet équipement pourrait être généralisée. De nombreux systèmes d'aides à la navigation faisant appel à des stations au sol sont en cours de mise au point.

Le radar de surveillance au sol est indispensable à l'efficacité du fonctionnement des services de la circulation aérienne.

Pour le service mobile aéronautique et pour le service fixe aéronautique, le principal but à atteindre est l'amélioration des moyens actuels et leur adaptation aux besoins des avions turbomachines, compte tenu de la vitesse plus élevée de ces avions. Il sera de plus en plus urgent d'établir une coordination entre le service fixe et le service mobile.

(COMMUNIQUÉ OACI, 18/2/57)

SWISSAIR-AKTIONÄR-FLUGBONS

Im Hinblick auf die Neuausgabe von Aktionär-Flugbons erinnern wir unsere Mitglieder, welche Aktionäre der Swissair sind, an die Sonderregelung zugunsten von Swissair-Angestellten, die im Februar 1956 getroffen wurde:

"In teilweiser Abweichung der Wegleitung vom 31.12.1955 können die auf Ihren Namen lautenden Flugbons vollumfänglich zur Bezahlung folgender Flugscheine verwendet werden:

- | | |
|---|---|
| - PERS.G.II-Flugscheine
(4 resp. 8%) | - Die jeweils erhobene Gebühr von 4% resp. 8% des anwendbaren Flugpreises kann vollständig mit Flugbons beglichen werden. |
| - PERS.R.I-Flugscheine
(50%) | - Der anwendbare, um 50% reduzierte Flugpreis kann vollständig mit Flugbons beglichen werden. |

... Die Verwendungsmöglichkeit der Flugbons erstreckt sich auch auf die im Freiflugreglement vom 27.12.1951 vorgesehenen begünstigten Familienangehörigen. ...

Falls sich die Notwendigkeit eines Ersatzes eines PERS.G.II-Flugscheines durch einen PERS.R.I-Flugschein ergibt, um bei Platzmangel eine feste Buchung für den Rückflug Ausland-Schweiz zu sichern, so kann die erforderliche Aufzahlung auf 50% des Flugpreises nach Ankunft in der Schweiz in Form von Flugbons vorgenommen werden. Zu diesem Zwecke ist die Abgangsstation im Ausland zu veranlassen, den neuen PERS.R.I-Flugschein auf Charges-Collect Basis auszustellen. ... "

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL REQUIREMENTS
FROM THE AIRLINE PILOTS' VIEWPOINT

By Captain J.D. Smith, Capital Airlines

Presented at the Fourth Annual ALPA Air Safety Forum, 1956.

Prior to broadly outlining traffic control requirements from the Airline Pilots' viewpoint, it is appropriate to briefly outline the status of the present system.

Without reservation, it can be stated that present utilization of existing systems is resulting in an unsatisfactory airline operation from an efficiency, public relations, and, sometimes, safety standpoint. The pilot group, together with others, has long ago concluded that definite improvements would be needed if the airline industry is to maintain a high passenger load factor, and an operation continuously consistent with safety. Each day of operation, particularly during IFR, merely tends to further justify our long-ago conclusions. In fact, it can now be assumed that users of the airspace all readily agree that the traffic control situation is one of the most serious problems affecting the further expansion of aviation.

Utilization of a traffic control concept which cannot handle existing demands, and, in particular, those of the future, can only result in causing further serious concern among airline pilots. Such a condition, if permitted to continue, will adversely affect our economic stability and safety of operations. It is because of these two points - continued safety and economics - that the Home Office has been expending considerable time and effort on the entire traffic control problem.

The recent large-scale orders for delivery of jet aircraft only serve to further intensify our serious concern over the present and future traffic control deficiencies.

If the present unsatisfactory utilization of traffic control knowledge is permitted to continue unabated, many of our membership, together with other segments of the industry, will have their potential earning power adversely affected. It just stands to reason that if excessive delays are experienced by the travelling public, they - the travelling public - will refrain from using our mode of transportation. When this demand decreases, so do the number of flights.

As the number of flights decreases, so do job requirements. This means fewer Captains and Copilots. Men on the left side go the right seat, and many of those in the right seat will find it necessary to seek employment elsewhere.

It may be somewhat difficult to fully appreciate this economic factor at a time when practically all airlines are seeking additional flight personnel. However, bear in mind that with the advent of turbo-prop and jet aircraft fully in operation, the airline industry will then have a seat capacity almost 3 times the size of present projected passenger demands. This, therefore, clearly indicates that an operation which continually permits scheduled departures and arrivals during all weather conditions is a very basic requirement for luring additional masses of the potential air-travelling public.

The industry is presently losing vast sums of money, particularly in short and medium haul-type trips, because of the public's unwillingness to be subjected to excessively delayed departures or arrivals when weather requires IFR operations. These excessive delays are already causing some carriers to curtail operations during IFR, because this is the only way some semblance of intelligent ship utilization and scheduled operations can eventually be realized. Many times it requires carriers periods of time in excess of 24 hours after IFR conditions before the operation is back on schedule.

This unreliable type of traffic control cannot be permitted to continue. If this inefficiency continues to plague the airline industry, we can foresee nothing but increased passenger reluctance to utilize our service when there are clouds in the sky. Such an element of retrogression can have nothing but an adverse effect on all of us in commercial aviation.

Inefficient utilization of existing traffic control knowledge adversely affects safety of operations by (1) Practically forcing use of VFR instead of IFR control in order to avoid needless delays. (2) Mass use by controllers of 1000 on top which, in effect, requires a flight crew to be solely responsible for separation. (3) Causing Center personnel to utilize an archaic manual strip posting system which creates serious individual workload problems. (4) Using altitudes for IFR procedures which, in effect, require the controlled aircraft to be at the same altitude, on a head-on course, as a VFR flight.

Summing up, then, present inadequate traffic control is definitely a threat to further expansion of commercial aviation and, if the present deficient condition is permitted to continue, will have an adverse effect on our economic stability. Furthermore, unless a concept resulting in positive separation becomes a reality, it is difficult to appreciate the present condition becoming anything but a very undesirable situation safety-wise.

As concerns traffic control requirements, needless to say, there are many. Some are available for implementation today; others in the near future, and, admittedly, a few are still in "Dreamland".

Referring specifically to the present - Our existing dilemma is not due solely to lack of equipment, personnel or a combination of both. Rather, the existing unsatisfactory product results to a large extent from (1) the gloating of those who attempt to outline how much more traffic was moved recently in comparison to a previous period, and (2) the inability to provide an overall intelligent airport expansion program.

For example, if just the carrier operations were to be conducted solely under IFR, flight movements would be seriously affected in a matter of hours - no one can deny that the airline operation would practically come to a standstill after this short period of time. Add to this, demands of the military, and there can be only one conclusion, namely, regardless of the strip posting count, regardless of the number of flight movements handled, the plain, unadulterated fact is that traffic control as we experience it today is not doing the job. Consequently, it is imperative that those responsible for traffic control immediately adopt the philosophy wherein it is decided to cease wasting time and effort attempting to justify this unsatisfactory condition, and, instead, bring about a program designed to safely satisfy the demands of all users of the airspace during all weather conditions.

Toward this end, it is fundamental that CAA fully accept their sole statutory responsibility for effecting traffic control. This responsibility must be applied regardless of the type aircraft involved.

All users of the airspace should be required to periodically advise CAA of their individual types of demands in order to provide necessary data for appropriate budget requests. In addition, when budget requests are finalized, the users should thoroughly support these joint budget requests at the Congressional level.

We should look with favor on a program whereby CAA supervises all traffic control and, to a certain extent, fulfills manpower requirements by utilizing military personnel who are under CAA jurisdiction. This type program has been used at some locations and has been quite successful. This system will provide the military with an effective means for fulfilling Stateside training of their personnel.

Controllers at the working level should be commended for the job they are doing with the antiquated tools they have to work with. It is quite simple to appreciate why the working level controller oftentimes questions the wisdom of remaining in traffic control. Therefore, it is felt imperative that a program be implemented to provide traffic controllers with an incentive to continue in the traffic control business.

This incentive can be brought about by improving the controllers' working conditions and implementation of a more realistic wage scale.

One of the yet unsolved problems deals with the manual strip posting procedure. This system causes an excessive workload on an individual controller and often times is the primary reason behind many of our IFR incidents. Regardless of what the eventual Common System is it is felt imperative that the working level controller will have to be provided a simple and accurate means for presenting flight information data. It is not possible to over-emphasize the need for this type equipment.

Presently, traffic control Centers have considerable difficulty maintaining or recruiting personnel primarily because of a non-commensurate pay scale. An experience level can be greatly increased if more realistic wage scales are provided.

It may well be that a wage increase will result in a cheaper overall cost of operation because the need for continually training new personnel will be greatly reduced. It should be borne in mind that traffic controllers are not developed overnight. There is a very lengthy training period involved which costs a considerable amount of money. Furthermore, no one can deny that experienced controllers will provide a more safe and efficient operation.

The Air Force is beginning to reap the benefits of reenlistments which result primarily from the increased wage scale and improved living conditions. There is no reason to believe that this type of philosophy, if provided, will result in anything else but a higher experience level among controllers.

An example of what realistic wages and working conditions may do can be gained by briefly reviewing some recent Air Force accomplishments. In an attempt to improve the military operation, traffic control-wise, the Air Force has recruited many experienced CAA supervisory personnel merely by providing these men with a better income and the opportunity to advance in stature. Many good key CAA personnel have accepted this offer and, as a result, in numerous areas the experience level of supervisory CAA personnel is the lowest it has been in years. Couple this with the fact that it is becoming increasingly more difficult to maintain the experience level of the controller and it is then possible to understand why we are so alarmed over the Air Force's present civilian traffic controller recruitment program.

It is felt CAA should establish a procedure whereby adequate liaison arrangements, personnel-wise, between CAA and the military can be maintained. In this manner it would then be possible for:

1. The military to accomplish Stateside training.
2. Maintaining the highest level of CAA supervisory experience.

3. Providing machinery whereby CAA can handle military training requirements and, at the same time, assume that many of these military trainees, upon completion of their service duty, will desire to continue employment as CAA traffic controllers.

Providing the proper incentive will make it possible to intelligently overcome the existing personnel problem. In any event, every attempt should be made to maintain the highest level of experience and proficiency.

An all-out attempt should be directed toward making maximum use of available tools. For example: 1. Low altitude control should be expanded at a faster pace; 2. Compulsory check points should be greatly reduced; 3. Holding 1000 on top in high-density terminal areas should be eliminated; 4. More efficient use of direct communications should be realized; 5. Approach control jurisdiction should be enlarged; 6. Considerable improvement at lower density airports could be gained if more thought were given to designing a greater flexibility of terminal flow procedures; 7. Realistic scheduling will provide a more accurate means for accomplishing intended ship utilization according to plan.

Implementation of these procedures would greatly improve efficiency and safety of operations. Inasmuch as the cost connected with these suggestions is practically nil, it is believed an accelerated plan to bring them immediately into play is most desirable.

Much of the time and effort traffic control-wise is being directed toward the eventual realization of the Common System. Unfortunately, this effort appears to be superseding the importance of the present and interim operation. This condition is quite unrealistic when considered that one cannot accurately forecast at what time we will reap maximum benefit of the Common System. It may be 5 - 10 - or 15 years - possibly longer.

In any event, this interim period should be properly defined and appropriate steps taken to insure maximum utilization of available machinery consistent with safety.

It should be recognized that satisfactory traffic flow is and will be directly related to the capacity of our airports. Traffic control must be viewed as beginning at the gate and ending at the ramp of the destination airport.

This requirement will greatly challenge the capabilities of airport operators. In fact, the present airport problem is of such magnitude that it is felt, regardless of the eventual solution (SAGE, Volscan, Navarrho, or anything else) we will not be able to move more traffic in the next 15 years than we presently know how to handle.

Presently, we know how to safely move at least 80 aircraft an hour through an airport during IFR. However, no domestic airport is capable of handling this volume of IFR traffic satisfactorily. Airport construction required to permit this volume of movements is tremendous and should be expeditiously and intelligently planned for. It should be realized that the airport capacity, as is the case today, is the key to determining exactly what benefits may be gained from more efficient traffic control. This point should be recognized by the military as well as civil.

Recently, the ALPA Air Traffic Control Study Committee met at the Home Office for the purpose of outlining the present traffic control problem and to develop a plan toward solution. The Committee felt that the existing condition was so serious that it was not possible to concentrate solely on the Utopian solution, but rather first develop some interim relief while at the same time looking toward the eventual answer.

Consequently, it then becomes necessary to expand our present available machinery where possible.

We believe it quite fundamental that dual ILS units be installed so as to:

1. Considerably reduce time-consuming circling approaches.
2. Permit greater overall completion of trips.
3. Bring about a more efficient traffic flow.

Visual aids, such as Configuration A approach lights with condenser discharge lighting should appear much faster than heretofore.

In speeding the arrival of all-weather operations, runway flush lighting should be adopted and implemented.

A program designed to provide positive separation throughout must be available prior to airline operation of jet aircraft. We should look with utmost concern upon being required to operate jet airliners on a "see and be seen" basis. Let's not be misled into thinking this is possible. On the contrary, during enroute and descents, it is not possible for the pilot to operate jet airliners VFR consistent with safety.

This problem (jet airline operations) is of such magnitude that it is felt the 14th Conception should determine whether airline pilots will operate jet airliners without having a means for providing continuous positive separation.

Accurate altimetry is of prime importance. Therefore, it is imperative that proper altimeter standards be set, and manufacturers be required to meet these limits if their products

are to be available for IFR operations.

In an effort to arrive at the Common System in the most expeditious manner, 4 course LF range stations should be decommissioned at the earliest possible date. Control of traffic on an area basis should also be implemented at the earliest possible date. This concept is one of the most effective ways for accomplishing a more efficient use of available airspace.

CAA presently is contemplating a radar network between BOS and ORF. The ALPA Air Traffic Control Study Committee does not look upon this program as the ultimate sole solution. However, the Committee will shortly request the membership to participate in this experiment because:

1. A very important phase of this trial is an attempt to solve the flight information data as presented to the controller. (We need this solution regardless of what the eventual system is.)
2. Joining in this evaluation will make it possible to accurately determine, from actual operations, the merits or demerits of a large-scale radar network.

Prior to recommending participation in the BOS-ORF program, the Committee believes it most important that the Administrator clearly outline to the Home Office CAA's current and future policy concerning using radar as a policing tool. Recently, actions by CAA, in isolated cases, which incidentally border on the ridiculous, have tended to convince numerous pilots that participating in the radar program is similar to "cutting off one's nose to spite one's face". This is a most undesirable condition. These types of incidents will have to cease and be completely eliminated if we are to materially benefit from expanding our present knowledge during the next couple of years.

A satisfactory airborne radar transponder is vitally needed and should be pursued on a top priority basis.

Proximity warning indicators should receive the same top priority status.

Airborne computers, such as DME, off-course - Pictorial, to mention a few, should be immediately evaluated for the purpose of determining how best this equipment will assist expansion of area control.

Once again, an intelligent airport improvement program must be undertaken.

The long-range solution should have the basic requirement permitting an expeditious and orderly transition. We have learned from sad experience that we cannot go directly from one system to the other overnight.

The ultimate system should permit maximum-continuous efficient use of all airspace, consistent with safety, during all weather conditions. This system should also substantially reduce the workload of both flight and ground personnel.

Of course, the ultimate will have to satisfy the demands of all users at all times.

We have high hopes that eventually we will practically eliminate the need for voice communications. This condition can be hastened by solving the flight data transfer problem of the controller.

We believe it most fundamental that airborne navigational equipment be capable of clearly indicating to flight personnel the exact position of an aircraft at all times.

Radar, used as a supplementary tool, should be capable of satisfactory performance during all weather conditions and at all altitudes. Altitude information must be provided on radar scopes.

Proper visual and approach coupler aids must be available for an all-weather operation.

Efficiency of aircraft movements during all weather conditions within the airport is a "must".

Aircraft should be capable of operating within a wide range of maneuvering speeds. This will permit greater flexibility in the terminal operation.

All of these requirements are vital parts of an overall eventual solution. However, prior to offering a realistic solution, one has to know the problem. To date, this has not been stated.

Recently, it was mentioned that at least 75 committees were working on the traffic control problem. It may be that the reason for all this Committee activity is the result of trying to "put the cart before the horse".

How can anyone come up with the answer when they don't know the problem? Prior to any intelligent solution, the users, airlines, military, executive, commercial and private, will have to outline what capacity they want the future traffic control system to have. Can we be satisfied with 80 movements per hour? Will we have to move more than this?

We need to know the terminal and enroute demands. Once this has been established, it will then be possible to intelligently develop the proper traffic control and airport capability.

Aviation has expanded at an amazing pace during the years. Unfortunately, the industry has not been afforded the proper utilization or implementation of traffic control know-how in recent years. The aviation industry can no longer tolerate continuance of this deficiency - neither can the military.

Consequently, it is most imperative that an offensive effort immediately become a reality. Let's get ahead of the traffic control demands for a change.

We hear a lot of talk about improvements; however, we all know that it is going to require more than talking to bring about substantial relief. For example: We knew nine years ago how to satisfactorily handle today's volume of traffic. Surely, no one can state that this long-ago acquired knowledge has been adequately implemented.

This country possesses an unending reservoir of aviation know-how. We urge most strongly that this wealth of knowledge be properly applied so as to bring about an efficient traffic control system during all-weather conditions, which is consistent with safety, at the earliest possible date.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL - PRIVATE PILOTS' VIEWPOINT

By Max Karant, V.P. Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

Presented at the fourth ALPA Air Safety Forum March 6,7 and 8, 1956

Thank you, J.D. I'm just as sensitive to those initials of his as some of the other people who introduced him. Whenever he calls on the telephone, even I flinch. Speaking of initials, I'm the S.O.B. from A.O.P.A. in D.C.A. Don't look for a prepared speech. There are no pages you can shuffle, so you might as well relax.

Seriously, I'm really grateful I've been invited here. I'm surprised you guys even tolerate me. You invited me last year and I had to cancel out at the last minute, and I was really sorry about that. After talking to some of you and after sitting here and listening to some of the talks that have already been made, I think I should have cancelled this time too. I'm about the only one here that disagrees with almost everyone here in the room.

I want to assure you of one thing. I think this is an excellent opportunity to at least get the word to some of the air line Pilots in regard to our point of view. I assure you on the record, and I hope the tape recorder is still running too, we do NOT hate air line pilots. As a matter of fact, I personally have spent as much time with air line pilots and air line problems as I have with private flying because, as some of you may know, prior to my joining AOPA I spent a lot of time as editor of Flying Magazine and with airline people. That's how I know so many of these enemies of mine up here. All we're looking for is

a little understanding and some consideration. I seriously regret the public controversy that has been going on. As many of you know, I have been the root of a lot of it. The free publicity that Jerry Lederer gave yesterday quoted me, and if anybody objects to this, I'll see you in the bar later.

You'd be surprised how much we agree with you. As a matter of fact I suspect you'd be amazed; even Sam Saint would be amazed. I even agree with many, well most, of the aspects of the Samcan system that he just read about. This is the latest successor to Tacan. We had Maxcan two years ago to succeed and now Tacan succeeds Maxcan, etc. We agreed immediately and understood completely the problem that the military face and the problem you people face at high altitude. We know that "see and be seen" is obsolete up there. As a matter of fact if I drive my automobile at 100 miles per hour on the highway, I'm sure "see and be seen" is obsolete. We know what the problem is and we agreed to a solution instantly. I don't think there was even any disagreement on the problem of getting positive control above a certain altitude.

The 24'000 feet that you heard is one. Our primary problem has to do, of course, with all this "horrah" about the air traffic control system. All of you are just obsessed with this discussion of air traffic control. I take a little different attitude toward this. My feeling on this matter is that air traffic control represents between 5 and 10% of all the flying being done in the United States, and I think that we should look at it somewhat in that light. I don't say that we should say that there is nothing in the world but VFR flying, but the least you could do is recognize that there is something on earth other than your particular problems. This is where the controversy comes from. 90 to 95% of the flying going on in the United States is uncontrolled. As a matter of fact, I got quite a kick out of J.D. arriving on a Greyhound Bus. I arrived VFR in my own airplane - legally. He said that proves that they are right. However, I WAS VFR. I may be going back with J.D. though.

Now the various proposals that have been thrown on the table here have to do with converting the 5 to 10% of the total traffic being operated under ATC to 90 or 95%, or as some of the far-sighted thinkers say, 100%. How this will even be done, God only knows. I have sat in Washington until I'm purple and I have seen nothing suggested that could do this, even scratched on paper, even Sam Saint can't suggest it, and Heaven knows that's really something.

How are you going to control 100% of the air traffic that we have today -- NOT what we're going to have next year or five years from now; just today. This is where our controversies start from. We object strenuously to this. We know what your problems

are. We have some of the same problems, incidentally. We are the ones, you know, who feel that one of the ten commandments should be "Thou Shalt Not Ram". The proposal, for example, that triggered off a lot of this controversy was one that stemmed from the airlines when they proposed raising the minimum VFR limit from 1000/3 to 1500/5, and you had to have a hole in the clouds two miles in diameter before you could go up through them. You had to be 1000 feet clear of the clouds below them as well on top, and so on into the night. Nobody apparently stopped to consider the consequences of such a proposal, nor did they even sit down and say, "now look, we intend beating your brains out, but how do you propose we can make it hurt least?" This never happened. We learned about this in one of those Montreal operations. I asked the Weather Bureau for their Aviation weather statistics for the past five years and just got some current dope. Take Chicago, they break down their ceilings into too broad a category. Six miles or less. You folks advocate five miles. Six is the closest the Weather Bureau has to this. Visibility six miles or less in Chicago, 39.2% of the time, for five years. You propose raising the limit from 3 to 5 miles and in this case I must go 3 to 6. This represents an increase in the burden on us of 30.2%. That means we don't fly for 30.2% of the time in Chicago. In Los Angeles, for example, no matter what the Chamber of Commerce tells you, the weather that you propose would cut out 47.3% of the available time that we could fly. Can't you just hear American Airlines or TWA if I stood up and suggested that they shut down 47% of their operations? Why you could hear the screams clear to Washington, but that's what has been proposed in our case. Nobody has the solution as to how we're going to continue to fly. We either fly IFR, we must be able to fly IFR, we must comply with all the rules of ATC, or get out of the air. Our reason for objecting to all of this, of course, is that we have a large industry and anything that you do of this kind, if you get away with it, will put us about in the same boat that Europe is in today. They've got airlines and military. Our members alone have 53 times more civil aircraft in their own possession than all the civil aircraft in the British Isles. So it would be quite a blow to adopt a system like they use over there.

We want Air Traffic Control. We use it. We use only a very small percentage of it now, but we're going to use more. Most of you are familiar with these light twin-engine airplanes that are now in production, and I will venture a guess that within a year, the total number of those twins in the air space will surpass all of the air transport airplanes in use. Those twins are designed to be flown at night and on instruments. Not to the extent that you guys do it, but they are still designed to do that and they can do a lot more and are doing a lot more than any of us did before.

I agree whole-heartedly with J.D. and everybody else on this business of the CAA losing their controllers. These people are vitally important to us and they are going to be more so. We are supporting any program we can to help keep these boys in. I don't know whether J.D. knows it or not, but the Chief Controller at Washington is gone. They just lost him and they just lost the Chief of the Washington Center to the military. This is a serious problem everywhere. I agree they should have more money, because we need them badly.

Much of our controversy boils down to the terminal area and its hazards. As you know, we have the world's leading example of the terminal area in Washington with their high density experiment. J.D. recently wrote an article for the Air Line Pilot. He said, obviously we've got to stop this monkey business, because the airplanes are going as fast as bullets". That's right; I've said the same thing. They are, but the thing that disturbs me is that all these intelligent people, these thinking intelligent people like Sam Saint lose sight of the fact that we have bullets in other walks of life and what do we do about bullets? We say "Mister, if you're going to shoot a gun, you go to a rifle range. If you show up anywhere else with that gun, you're going to get arrested". Now we have a means of slowing down these bullets, but the fact remains that if you admittedly point out that these are bullets and they are that dangerous, (and they are; I agree with you), then something has to be done about it. We need some rifle ranges. But the rifle range is not my front yard.

You have heard us on the subject of aircraft cockpits. We are interested in that SAE standard that you people and the manufacturers participated in. We are interested also in the fact that not one of the six contemporary types of transport airplanes comply with that standard. We agree with the Air Line Pilots Association on this point, and on our own side of the fence. We have asked for this same kind of thing and our manufacturers are highly disinterested. So, we are going to have to do something about it.

We agree also that there is complete disorder in these terminal areas and I was amazed to hear Sam describe this thing that we had in SC-31, because we also feel the same way. We should have routes in these busy areas so that all of us would be relatively safe and can move around them with ease. Everybody would generally know where everyone else is.

We are currently participating in a study of conflicts. Now our approach to this problem - this near-miss, mid air collision thing - is to take the collision which is the only thing that results from this business, and then work it backwards and see what caused it. We've done that, as many of you know. We did it

and printed it. It wasn't pretty. Now we are taking the same problem that we have in near-misses and working it backwards, and we are doing it in one terminal area. We've got some detailed reports from pilots on these near misses in this particular area. All but one of them were between airline and airline aircraft, airline and military, and or military and military. The one was a private twin-engine airplane. As you've already heard several times, weather was no factor.

At the present time we face another problem with communications. You people have your problems so you've junked some obsolete pieces of equipment that have fifty channels in it. I have eight in mine and Lord knows where I'm going to get four more and yet you people propose communications requirements in these terminal areas that would just run us out of the air on communications alone, plus the fact that the CAA doesn't know how they can cope with all the communications they've got now. In the Washington high density zone, incidentally, the CAA tower people tell me that they can give us advisory information on all the traffic that has to check in and out. But, they can only give us advisory information about 50% of the time. So the mere existence of the zone in that particular respect defeats its purpose. We also feel, as we have said before, that there is nothing wrong with the conflict problem that couldn't be covered by the existing Civil Air Regulations. We still think so, and we are ready, willing and able, any time, to sit down and discuss any changes in the Civil Air Regulations on the Basis of facts. I think we made that clear in Washington. We do feel that we need more enforcement, we need more education - and let me point out here, just in case somebody is ready to jump on me in the bar - I honestly admit that we make mistakes. I honestly admit that we have some knuckle-headed pilots. Some of our members have done some of the most stupid things that I can imagine. We have actually sent membership money back to a guy who has done something like that. We have actually encouraged punishment for one of our members for deliberately breaking the rules. This, I am sure, takes you completely by surprise, because I have yet to hear in any of these discussions that an airline pilot makes a mistake or has done something wrong. Now I think there is something in the professional pilot's creed that says you never do anything wrong whether you do or not. I am disturbed with this. The fault always lies somewhere else.

Now we want solutions to this ATC problem, this 10% of all flying that is being done. We want solutions to it because we are being hurt - not in the same way you are, but we are being hurt. But you must bear certain things in mind. You cannot advocate running a very substantial number of people out of the air. I'm sure you all recognize it when you stop and think about it. Whatever ultimate system you come up with must be what I would

call a "minimax" system. It must be designed to accommodate the minimum as well as the maximum. But, don't set your standards so high that a DC-3 can hardly comply with them. This again is a fundamental problem that we have with your proposals. The only concept I am suggesting in this particular respect is that you do what has already been done on the highways and waterways. I have said many times before that I can drive a Model T Ford on the most elaborate turnpike in the United States. There are minimum safety requirements that I must meet, but they are minimum enough so that a Model T Ford can meet them. What you propose is that I go somewhere else with my plane. This we cannot do. Civil aviation is now too large, both yours and ours, to just go arbitrarily slashing into things on the ground that you are so modern that you can't cope with yourselves.

Last year, as Jerry Lederer told you, we flew more than three times as many hours as you did. Some 40% of the total use of all the 180 CAA control towers were our type of aviation. The airlines were 30%. Those 180 airports are only 2.7% of all the civil airports in the United States. As Jerry said, only God knows how much traffic there really is.

We have had many collisions among ourselves. The collisions we have include training accidents, crop dusters and Lord knows what, and you've seen the experience level of some of the pilots that are around. But just considering the fact that 98.3% of all the civil aircraft are not scheduled airline aircraft, I don't think that's too bad a collision record.

Our air space use must be based on the philosophy that is now used with our other forms of transportation. I see no other way out of that. As I said, I can drive my Model T on the turnpike, but no matter how modern an automobile I buy, I cannot drive it 100 MPH no matter where I decide to want to do it. And, if the automobile is that modern, I either must be able to comply with the regulations or get off the road. The same philosophy applies on the water. No matter how many passengers an ocean liner is carrying, no matter how fast it can go, etc., when it gets to a certain place in the harbor it slows down like the rest of them - and if it breaks a rule and nothing more than a fishing boat is involved with only one person aboard - look out, you're still in trouble, no matter how big and important you are. As a matter of fact, the rules are never rewritten to give preferential treatment to anyone in that kind of a situation. The rules that are in existence actually penalize the professionals a good deal more than they do the non-professionals. I'm not advocating that you be penalized so we can sit and gloat. but unfortunately our way of life is that way, and we must recognize it. The courts of law recognized it.

All of us have got to live together in this air space. And, once again, let me assure you that we do not hate air line pilots and would love nothing better than to come back every year if you could stand it. As a matter of fact, I am looking forward to an invitation J.D. gave me to go up to the Regional Meeting in New York and there is one going to be held in Washington. Maybe next year you'll find me softened up a little.

I hope we can stop this public controversy. I dislike it a good deal more than many people realize and we are ready, willing and able to do all we can to stop it. If we could work it out with you folks, we would like nothing better.

Now we also have some ideas about what can be done in terminal areas and once again I find myself agreeing with Sam Saint. We think there should be an area like he has described. We think also that there should be a zone that is not closed to everybody. There should be some rules based on the volume of traffic going into the zone. It should be large, there should be a network of TVOR's probably, to give us the highway system around the zone that we will and must follow, and we thin, there should be 100% radar coverage in such a zone, both laterally and vertically. We think there should be widespread use of VHF direction finders. We also are concerned with the communications problem as I have told you.

We think that the rules that are written around such a zone should not permit an aircraft to enter that zone without doing certain basic things, and if you think I'm going to exclude two-way communications, you're wrong. We agree that there must be two-way communications. As a matter of fact, this little item always disturbs me because I haven't heard of a four place transportation aircraft that has been produced in the last five years without such equipment. Our big problem is to teach these people to use it and not to fear it.

There must be a speed limit in this zone and I think the speed limit, even for these jets, can be very realistic. I think also that there must be a rate of descent and rate of climb limit. You can't come screaming down 15,000 feet per minute in a terminal area, and I don't care what you're in. If you're not a menace to us, you sure are a menace to each other. I also feel that perhaps we ought to have automatic flight recorders to record all those various things that should be recorded in any aircraft, both military and civil that go into these terminal areas, or can cruise over 250 miles per hour.

It is now 12:23, and I will now retire to the bar for the beating I have coming.

1955 15.12.	Bourke, N.S.W., Austr.	-	DG-3 VH-
DCA ASD No.7, September 1956			

Unfall: Das Flugzeug rollte um 1337 (EST) zum Südwestende der Piste 05 des Flugplatzes Bourke und startete, ohne dass das Triebwerk ordnungsgemäss abgebremst worden wäre, unmittelbar zum Flug auf der Linie Bourke-Sydney, mit zehn Fluggästen an Bord. Der Startlauf verlief normal, aber unmittelbar nach dem Abheben begann der linke Motor unregelmässig zu laufen. Der Kommandant - der über die Flugeigenschaften des Flugzeugs und über das Verfahren bei Motorausfall nur mangelhaft unterrichtet war - hörte die Fehlzündungen und spürte asymmetrischen Druck auf dem Seitensteuer, wollte den Propeller auf Segelstellung setzen, unterliess aber, gleichzeitig den Gas- und Gemischhebel zurückzunehmen. Der Motor drehte weiter, und der Kommandant entschloss sich zu einer Notlandung, da er das Flugzeug nicht mehr sicher in der Luft halten zu können glaubte. Er setzte es in einer Entfernung von etwa anderthalb Meilen nach Pistenende in spärlich mit Bäumen bewachsenem Gelände auf den Boden, wobei es Feuer fing und zerstört wurde. Die Insassen konnten sich unverletzt retten..- Die Untersuchung des Triebwerks ergab, dass verschiedene Zündkerzen zufolge Bleiniederschlag praktisch kurzgeschlossen hatten.

Ursache: Durch ungenügenden Unterhalt bedingter Motorausfall im Start; unzweckmässiges Verhalten und unzweckmässiger Entschluss des ungenügend instruierten Kommandanten zur Notlandung.

1956 30.4.	Stansted, Ess.	Scottish Airlines	York G-AMUL
MTCA CAP 139, 15.8.1956			

Unfall: Das Flugzeug war vom britischen Luftfahrtministerium zur Beförderung von Luftwaffenpersonal und Angehörigen nach Irak gechartert. Es hatte fünf Mann Besatzung und 45 Fluggäste an Bord, als es kurz nach 0930 GMT auf der Piste 05 des Flughafens Stansted bei besten Wetterverhältnissen startete. Im Startlauf kam es zuerst leicht nach links, schwang dann - in einer Entfernung von 300 yds vom Pistenanfang - stark nach rechts, worauf der Kommandant noch links der Mittellinie die Leistung vollständig zurücknahm, geriet nach weiteren 100 yds rechts über die Piste hinaus, schob über einen 25 ft parallel zur Piste verlaufenden, roh aufgefüllten Kanalisationsgraben. Das rechte Fahrwerk brach los, das linke wurde in die Kabine gestossen, wodurch zwei Insassen getötet und vier schwer verletzt wurden. Wenig später blieb das Flugzeug ungefähr in Gegenrichtung zum Startlauf liegen. Die Feuerwehr war fast gleichzeitig zur Stelle und konnte die schwere Brandgefahr beseitigen. - In der Untersuchung erhoben sich keine Anhaltspunkte für Mängel am Flugzeug, ausser einer bekannten Neigung des Flugzeugmusters, beim Rollen nach links zu drehen. Durch den Kanalisationsgraben waren keine Flughafen-Bau- oder Betriebsvorschriften verletzt.

Ursache: Starke Ueberkorrektur einer (an sich bekannten) Drehtendenz zu Beginn des Startlaufs, eingeleitet durch Leistungsdifferential und (wahrscheinlich) verbunden mit einseitiger Bremsung.